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The  population  of  the  United  States,  not 
unlike  that  of  Canada,  Europe,  Russia,  Japan, 
and  Australia,  is  growing  older.  As  the  age 
structure  of  the  population  shifts,  issues  con 
cerning  the  “economics  of  aging”  arise.  In  the 
United  States  during  the  late  1970s  a  combi- 
nation  of  high  unemployment  and  high  infla- 
tion  contributed  to  several  Social  Security 
funding  crises.  When  policymakers  were  forced 
to  confront  these  immediate  crises,  they 
became  aware  of  the  long-term  implications  of 
an  aging  population. 
The  Social  Security  amendments  of  1983 
solved  the  short-run  financing  problems  of  the 
system.  Since  then  there  have  been  a  number 
of  studies  and  reports  on  the  economics  of 
aging.  Early  reports  warned  of  the  unmanage- 
able  crises  that  would  result  from  a  population 
of  too  few  workers  supporting  too  many 
retirees.  More  recenrly,  the  conclusions  have 
been  mixed.  There  are  still  plenty  of  doom  and 
gloom  assessments,  but  some  assessments  have 
been  downright  cheerful. 
Many  of  the  early  reports  based  most  of  their 
conclusions  solely  on  demographic  ratios. 
Later  reports  broadened  the  scope  of  informa- 
tion  they  studied  to  include  expcnditurc  pat- 
terns  of  various  age  groups,  general  economic 
growth,  early  retirement  programs,  changing 
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societal  expecmtions  regarding  retirement  income,  and  other  topics.  Although 
the  studies  arrive  at  a  wide  range  of  conclusions,  most  approach  the  conse- 
quences  of  an  aging  population  as  a  problem  that  will  not  occur  until  the  first 
quarter  of  next  century.  One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  S  Jay  Levy’s 
study  in  this  Public  Pub  Brief  is  that  hc  finds  that  the  problem  has  already 
emerged  and  that  it  must  be  dealt  with  at  the  policy  level  now,  however  politi- 
cally  distasteful  that  confrontation  will  be. 
What  will  be  the  economic  impacts  of  the  population  structure  resulting  from 
the  demographic  changes  occurring  in  industrialized  countries?  The  answer  to 
this  question  has  serious  policy  implications.  In  this  preliminary  study  of  the 
United  States,  Levy  examines  the  decline  in  standards  of  living  for  many  low- 
income  and  middle-income  wage  earners  during  the  1980s.  He  finds  that  stud- 
ies  of  the  tax  changes,  the  widening  income  disparity,  and  other  economic 
conditions  of  the  1980s  do  not  offer  a  satisfactory  explanation  for  this  decline. 
He  explores  the  hypothesis  that  there  has  been  a  “leak”  of  goods  and  services 
whereby  they  were  hecoming  increasingly  unavailable  to  workers,  the  people 
who  are  the  producers  of  those  goods  and  services. 
Levy’s  focus  is on  consumption  and  not  income  distribution.  In  comparing  the 
consumption  patterns  of  workers  and  retirees,  he  finds  that  retimes  are  absorb- 
ing  a  proportionately  higher  share  of  the  “economic  pie.”  Levy  concludes  that 
the  enlarging  portion  of  the  national  product  consumed  by  retirees  is  the 
equivalent  of  a  tax  on  nonretirees,  a  tax  that  is  especially  burdensome  for 
lower-income  workers. 
Levy  advocates  raising  the  retirement  age  and  encouraging  retirees  to  engage 
in  public  service  activities.  He  states  that  today’s  policies  are  directed  toward 
the  interests  of  retirees  and  the  preservation  of  their  wealth  and  income, 
Policymakers  have  the  opportunity  to  alter  this  direction  with  policies  more 
concerned  with  the  intetestq  of  workers  and  the  reward  of  production  and 
enterprise. 
Because  society  has  already  hegun  to  feel  the  effects  of  the  changing  popula- 
tion,  a  number  of  policy  initiatives  currently  underway  could  directly  addre.ss 
this  issue.  We  recognize  that  many  of  the  issues  concerning  the  economics  of 
aging  are  highly  complex  and  politically  charged.  Nonetheless,  there  are  issues 
of  fairness  that  need  to  be  considered.  We  believe  that  Levy’s  findings  will 
contribute  to  the  debate  and  stimulate  further  discussion. 
Dimitri  I3  Papadimitriou 
Exe&w  Director 
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Introduction 
The  1980s  left  a  legacy  of  troubling  eco- 
nomic,  social,  and  other  questions.  Among 
them  are  trends  in  the  division  of  the 
nation’s  product  of  consumer  goods  and  ser- 
vices,  the  “economic  pie.”  The  pie  grew 
quite  nicely  in  the  decade,  but  poverty 
nonetheless  became  more  prevalent.  This 
paper  raises  questions  of  equity,  but  does  not 
attempt  judgments. 
Retirees  have  been  consuming  a  growing 
portion  of  the  pie.  Their  share,  as  we  shall 
see,  increased  43.1  percent  from  1980  to 
1990.  They  took  so  much  that  while  the 
average  working  household’s  piece  of  the 
pie  rose  9.6  percent,  many  households  suf- 
fered  a  decline  in  standard  of  living. 
Particularly  affected  were  households  in  the 
two  lowest  income  quintiles.  The  standard 
of  living  of  some  households  was  augmented 
when  two  spouses  went  to  work.  The  female 
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labor  force  participation  rate,  51.5  percent  in  1980,  was  57.5  percent  10 
years  later. 
Increasing  quantities  of  goods  and  services  appeared  to  be  available  to 
the  nation’s  consumers  during  the  decade.  This  paper  is  concerned  with 
how  the  national  consumer  product  was  distributed  and  how  the  growing 
consumption  by  retirees  affected  what  was  left  for  workers.  The  conclu- 
sion  is  that  the  increasing  portion  of  the  economic  pie  taken  by  retirees 
is  tantamount  to  a  “tax”  on  nonretirees  that  falls  especially  heavily  on 
lower-income  people.  An  important  portion  of  retirees’  consumption 
was  health  care.  Since  most  of  their  health  care  was  paid  for  by  the  fed- 
eral  and  state  governments,  the  tax  on  nonretirees  is  not  just  a  figure  of 
speech,  but  often  an  actual  out-of-pocket  cost. 
What  this  paper  does  not  focus  on  is  the  distribution  of  income  and 
wealth.  Accordingly,  it  is  not  concerned  with  such  calculations  as  the 
values  of  imputed  interest  income,  fringe  benefits,  and  perquisites  or 
with  bequests  and  other  transfer  of  assets.  At  one  point  I  use  income  as 
a  proxy  for  consumption  in  order  to  check  on  consumption  data  in  a  way 
that  I  believe  has  some  reasonable  validity. 
The  Puzzling  Loss  of  Purchasing  Power  in  the  1980s 
A  worker’s  real  wage,  of  course,  determines  how  much  of  the  economic 
pie  he  or  she  is  able  to  obtain.  The  decline  in  real  wages  of  most  working 
Americans,  particularly  those  with  low  and  middle  incomes,  has  been  a 
puzzle  for  ar&ysts.  The  real  wage,  both  before  and  after  federal  income 
and  Social  Security  taxes,  of  a  typical  hourly-wage  earner  declined  from 
1980  to  1990,  However,  mean  real  income  of  workers’  households 
increased  11  percent  during  this  period  largely  because  of  gains  made  by 
the  top  quintile  and  the  increase  in  the  proportion  of  two-income  fami- 
lies.  Female  labor  force  participation  was  encouraged  by  the  growing 
inadequacy  of  the  volume  of  goods  and  services  that  could  be  purchased 
with  a  single  income. 
Rising  productivity  should  have  been  lifting  the  standard  of  living  during 
the  1980s.  The  gain  in  manufacturing  prbductivity  was  especially  gratify- Can  We  Afiord Grmuhm  md  Gmdpu? 
ing  and  explains,  in  large  degree,  why  consumer  goods  production 
(Federal  Reserve  Board  index)  rose  25.8  percent  from  1980  to  1990. 
Since  output  was  depressed  in  1980  by  the  recession,  a  fairer  comparison 
may  be  the  production  in  1978,  a  peak  year,  with  that  in  1990;’  the  gain 
was  2 1.4  percent. 
Even  the  balance  of  trade  deficit,  a  seriously  burdensome  drain  of  jobs 
and  profits  from  the  economy  and  a  still  unresolved  problem,  brought  a 
current  benefit  to  consumers  during  the  1980s.  Compared  to  previous 
decades,  Americans  were  the  recipients  of  a  substantial  net  inflow  of 
goods  from  abroad.  Data  from  the  National  Income  and  Product 
Accounts  (NIPA)  on  merchandise  exports  and  imports  indicate  that  real 
net  imports  of  consumer  goods  increased  somewhat  more  than  100  per* 
cent,  about  110  percent,  from  1980  to  1990.  The  volume  of  what  the 
NIPA  terms  “consumer  goods”  rose  163  percent  over  the  decade. 
However,  this  category  does  not  include  foods,  automobiles,  and 
petroleum,  much  of  which  is  properly  classified  as  consumer  products, 
but  how  much  is  not  clear. 
Changes  in  the  tax  laws  and  their  effect  on  the  distribution  of  income 
have  heen  closely  studied  by  economists  who  have  widely  concluded 
that  these  do  not  explain  the  decline  in  the  standard  of  living  of  wage 
earners.’  The  decline  in  a  typical  wage  earner’s  after-tax  income  was 
smaller  than  the  decrease  in  his  or  her  before-tax  income.  While  tax 
changes  of  the  1980s  treated  wealthy  people  generously,  they  henefited 
almost  everyone. 
The  married  person  who  had  three  dependents,  was  paid  for  working  40 
hours  a  week  and  52  weeks  a  year,  and  earned  the  average  wage  of 
hourly-wage  earners  suffered  a  decline  in  after-federal-tax  income  from 
1980  to  1990.  This  worker,  after  withholding  and  Social  Security  taxes, 
experienced  a  decline  in  annual  after-federal-tax  income  from  $18,995 
to  $18,190  (1.990  dollars),  a  4.25  p ercent  decrease.  The  Social  Security 
tax  rates  for  everyone  rose  during  the  decade,  but  this  worker’s  withhold- 
ing  tax  rate  declined.  CIvetall,  12.85  percent  of  his  or  her  income  went 
to  the  federal  government  in  1990,  down  from  13.63  percent  in  1980. 
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Studies  of  both  the  policies  of  the  1980s  and  the  widening  of  the  wage 
and  salary  gap  between  lower-  and  higher-paid  personnel  do  not  yield  a 
satisfactory  explanation  for  the  loss  of  real  income  of  the  majority  of 
wage  earners.3  Two  hypotheses  could  explain  this  phenomenon.  One, 
the  data  studied  by  economists  might  be  so  faulty  that  they  lead  to  false 
conclusions.  Two,  to  a  growing  degree,  goods  and  services  were  not 
available  to  their  producers,  the  workers  who  created  them,  but  were 
floating  away  into  unnoticed  hands-there  was  a  leak! 
I  am  hardly  a  devout  believer  in  the  accuracy  of  economic  and  social 
statistics,  and,  as  I  shall  explain,  1 have  problems  with  some  of  the  data 
used  in  this  study  to  locate  the  “leak.”  But  I  do  not  find  that  the  data  are 
misleading  us.  Indeed,  their  implications  are  confirmed  by  widespread 
day-to-day  experiences.  For  a  decade,  young  men  and  women  have  been 
having  difficulty  in  matching  the  standards  of  living  of  their  parents. 
Not  infrequently,  households  with  two  working  adults  have  been  strug- 
gling  to  achieve  as  much  purchasing  power  as  a  middle-  or  upper-middle 
class  male  wage  earner  alone  attained  a  gcncration  earlier. 
We  turn  to  the  possible  “leak”  of  goods  and  services  away  from  wage  and 
salary  earners.  One  facet  of  the  personal  income  and  consumption 
research  has  been  neglected.  Little  attention  has  been  given  to  the 
rapidly  growing  cohort  of  retirees  and  their  dependents.  Relatively  few 
people  age  65  and  older  are  full-time  workers,  and  most  of  them  are  not 
part  of  the  labor  force.  Persons  in  the  65  and  older  cohort  made  up  2.8 
percent  of  the  labor  force  in  1992  and  16.5  percent  of  the  population  age 
16  and  older.4  Both  the  numbers  and  the  real  incomes  and  purchasing 
power  of  the  senior  cohort  rose  during  the  past  decade  at  rates  consider- 
ably  faster  than  those  of  the  rest  of  the  adult  population. 
This  paper  concludes  that  the  declining  purchasing  power  of  the  wages 
and  salaries  of  the  lower-income  half  of  the  population  was,  at  least  to  a 
large  degree,  the  result  of  the  rising  consumption  of  the  retired  cohort  of 
the  population.  These  older  people  were  consuming  a  growing  portion  of 
the  economic  pie,  seriously  cutting  into  the  share  of  the  working  cohort. 
Although  I  have  little  doubt  about  the  validity  of  this  conclusion,  my 
exploration  of  the  issue  is  only  a  beginning.  Further  studies  will  refine 
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some  of  the  data  that  are  available. 
The  Cost  of  Supporting  Retirees 
When  I  considered  the  “leak”  chat  represented  workers’  seeming  loss  of 
part  of  their  production,  I  suspected  the  age  65  and  older  segment  of  the 
population,  which  contributes  proportionately  little  to  the  current  eco- 
nomic  pie.  My  surmise  was  that  the  consumption  of  the  older  cohort  left 
substantially  less  goods  and  services  for  many  younger  households  in 
1990  than  it  did  in  1980. 
I  have  found  that  my  suspicions  were  correct.  Consumption  by  the  65 
and  older  segment  was  indeed  growing  at  the  expense  of  younger  people. 
EIetween  1980  and  1990  the  increasing  share  of  the  economic  pie  con- 
sumed  by  the  oIder  group  was  reflected  in  a  significant  depletion  in  the 
portion  left  for  younger  households.  By  1990  this  lo-year  gain  of  the 
older  cohort  amounted  to  a  substantial  cost  to  the  average  younger 
household-at  least  $1,000  and  probably  wei1  over  $1,500  a  year. 
I  am  designating  the  65  and  older  households  as  “retirees”  and  the  64 
and  younger  households  as  “workers.”  These  categorizations  are  rough- 
over  3.5  million  people  who  have  celebrated  their  sixty-fifth  birthday  are 
working,  and  a  great  many  retirees  have  not  reached  this  age  boundary.  I 
am  probably  underestimating  the  population  of  the  retirees  considerably 
and  therefore  the  size  of  the  “leak.” 
Once  upon  a  time,  when  grandpa  and  grandma  were  beyond  the  age 
when  they  could  support  themselves,  they  typically  moved  into  the 
home  of  one  of  their  children.  The  persons  who  were  wholly  or  partially 
supporting  an  aged  parent  or  hoth  parents  were  well  aware  of  the  cost  of 
maintaining  these  old  folk-who  nowadays,  perhaps  because  they  effec- 
tively  use  their  votes,  are  called  “senior  citizens.”  Feeding,  clothing,  and 
sheltering  aging  parents  put  a  visible  dent  in  their  children’s  household 
budgets.  Paying  their  doctor  and  hospital  bills  often  caused  a  family  buds 
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Our  society  has  advanced  in  some  respects.  It  has  Social  Security  and 
widespread  pension  plans  that  enable  older  people  to  live  in  separate 
dwellings,  often  in  some  inviting  climate  a  long  distance  from  their  offs 
spring-perhaps  in  Arizona  or  Florida.  Moreover,  Medicare  and 
Medicaid  pay  most  of  their  health  care  expenses.  But  the  comfort  of  the 
65  and  older  cohort  is  still  costly  for  working  men  and  women. 
Many  contemporary  households  include  two  adults  who  work  hard  to 
maintain  what  they  regard  as  an  adequate  or  satisfactory  standard  of  liv- 
ing,  who  anxiously  seek  day  care  for  their  small  children,  and  who  spend 
little  time  worrying  about  the  economic  well-being  of  the  grandparents. 
The  grandparents  now  live  in  retirement,  often  quite  well,  in  Sarasota  or 
Palm  L)esert.  The  working  adults  have  no  notion  that  they  are  contribute 
ing  to  paying  for  their  parents’  food,  clothing,  shelter,  and  amenities.  Yet 
the  retirees,  those  who  produce  little  or  nothing  and  consume  goods  and 
services  of  substantial  value,  are  consuming  what  active  workers  are  pro- 
ducing-leaving  less  for  the  workers.  The  financial  flows  that  cause  such 
a  phenomenon  may  or  may  not  provide  a  moral  basis  for  this  distribution 
of  consumption,  but  they  do  not  alter  the  fact. 
Sometimes  retirees’  consumption  is  for  their  offspring.  They  may  con- 
tribute  to  their  grandchildren’s  education  and  in  other  ways  subsidize 
younger  generations.  Nonetheless,  retirees  are  not  producers,  and  they 
consume  the  product  of  workers  even  when  members  of  workers’  house- 
holds  arc  the  beneficiaries  of  their  consumption.  On  the  other  hand,  off- 
spring,  especially  those  who  are  financially  successful,  may  assume  some 
of  the  expenses  of  their  elderly  parents. 
Many  intergenerational  transfers  are  not  visible  in  the  data  that  measure 
consumption.  For  example,  grandparents  may  provide  child  care  for 
working  parents,  run  household  errands  for  them,  or  tend  their  gardens. 
On  the  other  hand,  adult  offspring  frequently  care  for  ill  or  infirm  par- 
ents.  The  exchange  of  services  between  generations  complicates  the 
question:  Is  the  economic  pie  distributed  equitably  between  retirees  and 
workers? 
Providing  health  care  for  the  elderly  would  seem  a  prima  facie  ethical 
imperative  unless  doing  so  deprives  young  children  of  such  services. 
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About  two-fifths  of  the  consumption  of  the  households  headed  by  people 
age  65  and  older  is  ostensibly  for  health  care.’  But  “health  care”  is  not 
clearly  definable.  Approximately  20  percent  of  retirees’  heahh  expendi- 
tures  is  for  nursing  home  care.  Many  elderly  are  sheltered  and  fed  in  such 
institutions.  In  fact,  everyone  finds  that  food  and  shelter  are  good  for 
health,  but  no  one  claims,  for  example,  that  a  hamburger  at  McDonald’s 
or  an  omelet  at  home  is  health  care.  Workmg  in  a  gymnasium  under  the 
supervision  of  a  registered  physical  therapist  is  considered  health  care. 
But  the  purchase  of  a  trezrdmill  for  home  exercise  may  be  regarded  by 
statistical  authorities  with  a  bent  toward  ghoulishness  as  a  recreation  and 
entertainment  expenditure.  Another  question  is:  What  portion  of  the 
investments  in  such  facilities  as  hospitals,  nursing  homes,  and  medical 
schools  and  in  research  and  development  should  be  considered  the  cosrs 
of  people  who  may  not  live  long  enough  to  benefit  from  them? 
The  real  cost  of  retirees  to  workers,  which  is  reflected  in  declining  stan- 
dards  of  living  of  the  workers  during  the  period  studied,  would  have  been 
less  noticeable  if  the  output  of  consumer  goods  and  services  had 
increased  at  a  faster  pace.  Greater  productivity,  higher  employment,  or 
both  reflected  in  higher  output  could  have  ameliorated  this  situation. 
This  paper  concentrates  on  what  occurred,  not  on  what  might  have  hap- 
pened. 
Rapid  Growth  of  Retime  Population 
According  to  the  Bureau  of  the  Census,  the  1980s  was  a  decade  of  rapid 
growth  for  retiree  households,  that  is,  those  with  “householders”  age  65 
and  older.  (The  Bureau  of  the  Census  uses  the  term  householder  for  the 
owner  or  renter  of  the  dwelling  or  one  of  them  if,  say,  a  husband  and 
wife  are  joint  owners  or  lessees.)  Retiree  households  increased  in  number 
considerably  faster  than  the  rest  of  the  nation’s  households,  those  64  and 
younger.  The  older  households  increased  21.4  percent  from  1980  to 
1990;  the  younger  12.7  percent  over  the  same  period.  These  figures 
closely  parallel  the  increases  in  the  segments  of  the  population  age  65 
and  older  and  age  18  to  64,  2  1.5  percent  and  11.7  percent,  respectively 
(Table  l), 
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1980  1990 
Percent  Change, 
1980  to  1990 
Number  of  households 
64  and  younger 
65  and  older 
Population 
18  to  64 
65  and  older 
Number  of  consumer  units 
64  and  younger 
65  and  older 
65,456  73,785  12.7 
16,912  20,527  21.4 
137,834  154,006  11.7 
25,707  31,224  21.5 
65,023  76,88?  18.2 
17,029  20,079  17.9 
Social  Security  worker 
beneficiaries  19,562  24,838  27.0 
Some:  Bureau  of  the  Census;  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics;  U.S.  Department  of  Health  and 
1Human  Services,  Social  Security  AJministmtion. 
I  have  concentrated  on  households  and  what  the  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics  (BLS)  calls  consumer  units  (CUs),  which  are  slightly  different 
from  households.’  The  data  on  CUs  provide  an  opportunity  to  observe 
the  income  and  expenditures  of  the  working  and  retired  segments  of  the 
population.  Unlike  households,  the  number  of  consumer  units  in  the  65 
and  older  and  64  and  younger  categories  increased  at  about  the  same 
pace  from  1980  to  1990,  17.9  percent  and  18.2  percent,  respectively 
(Table  I).  In  view  of  the  figures  mentioned  in  the  previous  paragraph 
and  the  rise  in  the  number  of  workers  receiving  Social  Security  benefit 
payments,  the  accuracy  of  this  aspect  of  the  consumer  unit  data  is  sus- 
pect. 
An  indication  of  the  number  of  retirees  is  the  number  of  former  workers 
receiving  old-age  benefits  under  the  Social  Security  program.  This  popu- 
lation  has  been  larger  and  growing  faster  than  the  number  of  65  and 
older  households  and  consumer  units;  it  increased  27.0  percent  from 
1980  to  1990  (Table  1).  A  problem  with  the  Social  Security  roster  for 
my  purposes  is  that  a  household  or  a  consumer  unit  may  include  more 
than  one  worker  currently  receiving  Social  Security  benefit  payments. 
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An  actual  count  of  retirees  would  considerably  exceed  the  number  of 
Social  Security  beneficiaries.  Many  people  in  these  times  of  early  rctirc- 
ment  become  retirees  before  they  reach  62,  the  age  at  which  they  arc 
eligible  for  Social  Security  benefits.  An  insight  into  the  number  of  early 
retirees  is  indicated  by  the  drop  in  labor  force  participation  between  the 
segment  of  the  population  age  45  to  54  and  the  segment  age  55  to  64. 
In  1992  about  81  percent  of  the  former  and  56  percent  of  the  latter 
were  in  the  labor  force.  About  one-fourth  of  the  people  who  had  been 
in  the  labor  force  when  they  were  45  to  54  apparently  dropped  out 
between  the  ages  of  55  and  64.  Based  on  this  decline  in  labor  force  par- 
ticipation,  5.3  million  persons  age  55  to  64  were  retirees-consumers 
but  not  producersi 
Because  of  the  absence  of  data  on  both  the  incomes  and  expenditures  of 
Social  Security  beneficiaries,  this  appraisal  concentrates  on  households 
and  consumer  units.  The  figures  derived  from  the  USC  of  these  two  catee 
gories,  which  undercounts  the  actual  population  of  retirees,  understates 
the  cost  to  active  workers  of  producing  for  retirees. 
Retirees’ Purchasing  Power Rises Faster Than Workers’ 
During  the  1980s  the  expenditures  for  the  goods  and  services  consumed 
by  the  average  consumer  unit  headed  by  a  person  65  or  older  rose  21.9 
percent  from  $18,751  to  $22,859  (’  in  constant  1990  dohats),  an  increase 
of  $4,108.  Net  Medicare  benefit  payments  (payments  less  premiums)  are 
added  to  the  BLS  data  for  this  cohort’s  expenditures.’  While  the  real 
expenditures  of  retirees  grew  21.9  percent  from  1980  to  1990,  those  of 
workers  increased  7.1  percent,  $1,849  (Table  2). 
The  gain  for  the  retirees  reflected  an  increase  in  their  consumption  of 
the  goods  and  services  produced  by  the  workers.  Conversely,  workers 
were  losing  a  growing  volume  of  the  goods  and  services  that  they  were 
producing-a  leak  of  expanding  volume.  In  1980  17.4  percent  of  the 
output  of  the  average  worker  CU  was  consumed  by  retiree  CUs;  in  1990 
retirees  were  taking  20.4  percent  of  the  workers’  product  (Table  3).9 
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Table  2  Expenditures  of  Average  Consumer  Unit 
(in  constant  1990  dollars) 
Percent  Increase, 
1980  1990  1980  to  1990 
64  and  younger  26,018  27,867  7.1 
65  and  older  HJ7.51  22,859  21.9 
Note:  bpenditures  exclude  personal  insurance  and  pension  outlays.  Expenditures  of  the  65 
and  older  cohort  include  Medicare  outlays. 
Source:  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Cm-mmer  l+enditwe  Surveys. 
The  adverse  effect  on  the  real  purchasing  power  of  consumer  units 
headed  by  persons  64  and  younger,  the  working  consumer  units,  was  the 
same  as  if  government  had  taxed  them  an  additional  !$836  or  3.0  percent 
of  their  expenditures  (Table  3). 
Problems  with  the  costs  and  even  the  definition  of  health  care  thwarted 
the  desirable  refinement  of  the  data.  Overcoming  these  difficulties  would 
probably  have  slightly  reduced  the  cost  to  workers  of  supporting  retirees’ 
consumption.  I  am  assuming  that  accounting  for  Medicaid  would  not 
significantly  change  the  foregoing  conclusions  because  this  federal  pro- 
gram  distributes  funds  to  both  worker  and  retiree  consumer  units. 
Although  the  population  64  and  younger  is  more  than  seven  times  larger 
than  the  population  65  and  older,  the  latter’s  per  capita  Medicaid  bene- 
fits  are  nearly  five  times  larger  than  the  former’s.lo  Employer-paid  health 
insurance  policies  cover  both  workers  and  retirees  and  the  distribution  of 
the  premiums  between  these  two  groups  is  obscure. 
Whereas  the  missing  health  care  data  suggest  that  retirees’  share  of  total 
consumption  was  not  quite  as  large  as  indicated  above,  the  saving  statis- 
tics  for  consumer  units  hint  otherwise.  The  latter  data  indicate  savings 
that  should  delight  all  those  who  have  been  shaking  their  heads  in  dis- 
may  over  Americans’  lack  of  frugality.  In  1980  CUs  saved  5.8  percent  of 
their  after-tax  income,  and  by  1990  the  saving  rate  had  climbed  to  10.9 
percent.  Meanwhile  the  authoritative  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis’s 
personal  saving  rate,  an  item  in  the  National  Income  and  Product 
Accounts  (NIPA),  slumped  from  7.9  percent  to  4.3  percent  (Table  4). 
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Table  3  Retirees’  Consumption  of the  Product  of Worker  CUs  and  Cost  of 
Retirees  to  Workers  (in  constant  1990  dollars) 
Percent Increase,  Percent  Difference, 
1980  1990  1980 to  1990  1990 Less  1980 
Total  expenditures,  65 
and  older  (millions 
of  dollars~  319,315  458,989  43.7 
Cost  of  65 and  older 
to  averaRe  64  and 
younger  4,911  5,969  21.5 
Percent  of  product  of  64 
and  younger  for 
65  and  older  17.4  20.4  3.0 
Norc:  Expendimres  of  65  and  older  include  Medicare  and  exclude  paymcnw  for  private 
pcmiuns  and  insurance. 
Souwe:  hrcau  of  L&r  Statistics. 
(If  saving  is  defined  to  include  the  net  flow  of  funds  into  the  state  and 
local  government  employee  pension  funds,  the  fall  in  NIPA  personal 
saving  over  the  decade  was  from  9.3  percent  to  5.9  percent.) 
Consumer  unirs  65  and  older  saved  -9.3  percent  of  their  income,  that  is, 
they  “dissaved”  in  1980.  Ten  years  later  the  saving  rate  of  these  older 
CUs  was  -0.7  percent  (Table  4).  The  mte  fluctuated  wildly  during  the 
decade,  climbing  to  a  peak  of  8.8  in  1982,  descending  to  a  trough  of 
-15.6  in  1984,  and  then  slowly  increasing  to  2.0  in  1989.  (These  per- 
centages  were  calculated  without  counting  Medicare  payments  as  part  of 
either  consumer  units’  income  or  expenditure.) 
The  accuracy  of  these  saving  rates  is  suspect.  The  staggering  difference 
hetween  the  NIPA  and  the  CU  data  on  saving  trends  and  the  rather 
erratic  fluctuations  in  the  latter  raise  questions  about  the  expenditures  of 
CUs.  If  the  NIPA  daea,  which  show  an  overall  decline  in  saving  during 
the  198Os,  apply  to  the  65  and  older  cohort  and  this  group,  too,  had  a 
lower  saving  rate  in  1990  than  in  1980,  thcsc  retirees  would  have  taken 
even  more  of  the  available  goods  and  services  in  1990  than  the  above 
figures  indicate. 
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Saving  Rate,  Saving  Rate, 
Personal  FM  All  cus 
Saving  Rate, 
65  and  Older 
1980  7.9  5.8 
1981  8.8  11.3 
1982  8.6  15.6 
1983  6.8  13.0 
19%  8.0  9.9 
1985  6.4  6.2 
1986  6.0  6.5 
1987  4.3  10.6 
1988  4.4  9.6 
1989  4,O  11.1 











Source:  Bureau  of  Eccmomlc  Analysis  and  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Consumed  L’nit 
hwys. 
The  increase  from  1980 to  1990 in  the  mean  before-tax  income  was  94.7 
percent  for  65 and  older  households  and  96.0  percent  for  65  and  older 
CUs.  This  close  agreement  at  least  superficially  suggests  that  these  data 
are  accurate.  A  useful,  working  hypothesis  may  therefore  emphasize 
income  as  the  determinant  of  changes  in  consumption  and  relegate  sav- 
ing  to  an  insignificant  role.  If  saving  wcrc  zero  in  1980  and  1990,  income 
then  would  be  a  perfect  proxy  for  expenditures, 
The  Bureau  of  Census  data  show  that  the  total  income  of  the  65  and 
older  households  (net  Medicare  benefits  added)  in  1990  dollars 
increased  54.2  percent,  more  than  twice  as  fast  as  the  total  income  of  the 
rest  of  households,  which  rose  25.1  percent  (Table  5).  Over  the  same  10 
years  the  average  income  in  1990  dollars  of  retiree  households  rose  27.1 
percent,  while  that  of  worker  households  increased  11.0  percent  (Table 
5).  The  zero  saving  hypothesis  indicates  that  the  retiree  cohort  took  16.3 
percent  of  the  average  worker  household’s  income  in  1980,  20.0  percent 
in  1990.  The  zero  saving  rate  supposition  thus  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  increase  of  retiree  real  income  over  the  decade  would  have  had 
the  same  effect  on  the  working  households  as  a  tax  increase  of  3.7  per- 
cent  on  their  income.  Based  on  this  analysis,  the  increasing  income  of 
the  retirees  cost  the  average  active  worker  household  $1,516  (1990  doI+ 
lars)  more  in  purchasing  power  in  1990  than  in  1980. 
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Table  5  Retirees’  Income  Versus  Worker  Households’  Real  Income 
(in  constant  1990  dollars) 
1980 
Percent  Increase,  Percent  Diiererw, 
1990  1980  to  1990  1990  Less  1980 
Total  income  (millions 
of  dollars) 
64  and  younger  2,416,048  3,022,875  25.1 
65  and  older  392,641  605,597  54.2 
Cost  of  65  and  older  to 
average  64  and 
younger  5,999  8,208  .36.8 
Percent  of  income  of 
64  and  younger 
for  65  and  older 
Mean  income,  64  and 
younger 
16.3  20.0 
36,911  40,969  11.0 
3.7 
Mean  income,  with 
Medicare,  65 
and  older  23,217  29,502  27.1 
Source:  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Cur-rent  I’upJutirm  Rcprt.s,  Series  P-60:  Money  Income  of 
Households,  Families,  and  l’ersons  in  the  United  States;  Bureau  of  labor  Statistics, 
Censumer  B.QCT&UW Sur~ys;  Bureau  uf  Bcenumic  Analysis. 
Gf  course,  saving  was  not  zero.  Still  the  zero  saving  rate  hypothesis  gives 
a  reasonable  clue  to  the  degree  to  which  the  share  of  the  economic  pie 
going  to  retirees  was  eroding  the  workers’  portion.  Until  further  research 
is  able  to  produce  better  data,  the  3.0  percent  or  3.7  percent  “tax”  on  the 
worker  cohort  stands  as  a  fair  explanation  for  the  poor  growth  in  its  stan- 
dard  of  living  during  the  past  decade. 
Ethics and the  Intergenerational  Tug-of-War 
Grandpa  and  grandma  may  be  on  their  own  and  no  longer  occupying 
what  used  to  he  a  guest’s  room  upstairs.  But  they  continually  have  been 
gobbling  up  a  larger  portion  of  the  economic  pie,  leaving  a  relatively 
smaller  share  for  the  segment  of  the  population  that  is  creating  the  pie. 
While  they  were  workers,  grandpa  and  grandma  paid  Social  Security taxes,  bought  life  insurance,  and  received  part  of  their  income  in  the  form 
of  employer  contributions  to  theit  pension  funds.  Based  on  the  conven- 
tions  of  our  society,  they  certainly  have  a right  to  the  comfortable  retire- 
ments  that  most  of  the  elderly  enjoy. 
We  conventionally  tend  to  stress  money  even  when  a focus  on  physical 
output  and  consumption  would  clarify  the  issue.  people  do  tend  to  mea- 
sure  the  value  of  their  incomes  and  the  amount  of  their  consumption  in 
terms  of  specific  goods  and  services  when  inflation  rapidly  devalues 
money.  Then,  because  money  is failing  as  a gauge,  we  complain  about 
how  few  pounds  of  steak,  pairs  of  shoes,  yards  of  carpeting,  and  so  forth 
we  are  able  to  buy.  Let  us  think  for  a moment  about  workers’  saving  and 
retirees’  consumption,  not  in  dollars,  but  in  terms  of  goods  and  services. 
Take  a person,  for  example,  a man  who  goes  to  work  at  age  25,  retires  at 
65,  and  dies  at  75.  During  his  forty  years  of  work,  his  earnings  presumably 
measured  his  contribution  to  the  production  of  goods  and  services,  the 
goods  and  services  he  produced.  As  a retiree,  he  consumes  two-thirds  of 
the  goods  and  services  that  represented  his  average  standard  of  living  dur- 
ing  those  working  years.  (In  1990  the  average  expenditures  of  retiree  CUs 
was  64  percent  as  high  as  those  of  worker  CUs.) 
In  terms  of  goods  and  services,  our  retiree  would  have  had  to  save  one- 
sixth  of  his  average  income,  maintaining  a 16.7  percent  saving  rate,  dur- 
ing  40  years  of  work  to  allow  him  two-thirds  of  his  average  working  years’ 
standard  of  living  in  10  years  of  rctircmcnt.  Right  now  the  NIPA  saving 
rate  is well  under  5.0  percent  of  income.  Looking  at  the  issue  in  this  man- 
ner,  retirees  are  unfairly  consuming  too  large  a share  of  the  economic  pie. 
However,  with  employer  and  employee  Social  Security  taxes,  including 
Medicare,  running  at  12.4  percent  of  wages  and  salaries  (a  form  of  saving 
omitted  from  the  NIPA  figure),  the  average  worker  may  be  justifying  his 
future  consumption  as  a retiree.  Moreover,  we  must  weigh  the  wishes  of 
the  working  cohort.  Its  members  may  be  glad  to  sacrifice  a slowly  increass 
ing  portion  of  their  standard  of  living  in  order  to  increase  the  comfort  and 
especially  to  maintain  the  health  of  their  parents. 
The  working  population  in  the  1980s  was  not  uniformly  affected  by  the 
growing  share  of  the  economic  pie  consumed  by  retirees.  Economists, 
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sociologists,  and  others  genetally  have  recognized  and  have  been  ponder- 
ing  the  implications  of  the  growing  disparity  in  compensation  between 
those  whose  occupations  demand  considerable  skill,  education,  or  both 
and  the  rest  of  the  active  labor  force.  Further  studies  should  determine 
whether  or  not  the  retirees’  growing  share  of  the  economic  pie  is  a  signifi- 
cant  cause  of  the  decline  in  the  standard  of  living  of  the  lesssskilled  and 
less-educated  workers,  the  part  of  the  population  that  clearly  has  had  a 
declining  standard  of  living. 
Explorations  into  this  area  may  find  that  a  shift  in  the  demand  for  labor 
toward  lower-paid  workers  is  partly  attributable  to  the  growing  segment  of 
the  population  that  is  65  and  older.  These  people  demand  more  personal 
services  than  the  rest  of  the  population,  services  that  in  many  instances 
can  be  provided  by  persons  with  little  skill  or  education.  At  the  same 
time  older  people  buy  relatively  few  automobiles  and,  perhaps,  other 
products  that  require  well-paid,  skilled  personnel  to  manufacture+ 
Certainly  suffering  from  a  diminishing  portion  of  economic  pie  are  adults 
under  the  age  of  35,  especially  those  below  25.  The  average  real  con 
sumption  expenditures  of  consumer  units  age  24  and  younger  declined  3.0 
percent  from  1980  to  1990.  One  might  wonder  whether  grandpa  and 
grandma  are  devouring  their  children.  The  25s  to  3+  year-old  CUs  had  a 
slight  1.  I  percent  increase  in  constant  dollar  consumption  outlays.  The 
rise  in  two-income  households  made  this  gain  possible. 
The  Imperative:  Wgorous  Growth  of  Robust  Enterprises 
Analysts  have  been  appalled  for  a  long  time  over  the  prospect  of  a  disc 
proportionately  large  retiree  population  and  relatively  few  producers 
around  the  year  2025,  when  the  wave  of  baby  boomers  reaching  retire- 
ment  age  is  expected  to  crest.  The  problem  that  economists  have  antici- 
pated,  and  which  was  recognized  in  the  1986  legislation  that  increased 
Social  Security  taxes,  is,  to  a  serious  degree,  already  here.  It  demands 
that  the  findings  of  this  preliminary  study  be  pursued  and  refined. 
Enough  is  patently  clear  to  warrant  the  adoption  of  policies  that  have 
been  advocated  for  years,  but  are  never  truly  on  the  political  agenda. The  Economics  of  A.ging 
Retirement  ages  should  be  raised.  Moreover,  retirees  should  be  encour- 
aged  to  engage  in  public  service  activities.  Many  already  are  volunteers 
in  such  federally  sponsored  programs  as  VISTA  (Vohinteers  in  Service 
to  America),  Foster  Grandparents,  and  Retired  Senior  Volunteers.  Many 
more  engage  in  hospital-  or  church-related  and  other  service  activities. 
Retirees  improve  the  standards  of  living  of  many  workers  and  their 
dependents  by  rendering  services  that  national  product  and  consumption 
data  ignore. 
Still  the  key  issue  in  enlarging  the  economic  pie  for  everyone  is  funda- 
mental;  it  is  miernp~yrnent.  Excessive  labor  supply  has  given  employers 
the  luxury  of  being  needlessly  choosy  about  whom  they  keep  on  their 
payrolls.  They  can  avoid  the  bother  and  expense  of  training  less  qualified 
personnel.  And  they  push  older  people  into  early  retirement.  The 
decline  in  the  labor  force  participation  of  persons  age  55  to  C#  reflects 
the  opportunity  to  dispense  with  employees  whose  seniority  and  age  may 
entitle  them  to  compensations  and  benefits  larger  than  those  received  by 
less  experienced  people.  Employers,  moreover,  are  likely  to  prefer  under- 
taking  the  costs  incurred  when  workers  learn  to  use  newly  installed 
equipment  and  to  exploit  new  techniques  if  the  pupils  are  young  and  wiIl 
use  the  new  skills  longer  than  those  approaching  retirement.  Youth  is  an 
attraction  in  this  dynamic  era  of  computers  and  global  business  and 
finance. 
In  the  early  postwar  era  pohcies  were  determined  by  the  needs  of  youth, 
of  the  young  veterans  of  World  War  II.  They  needed  education  and  jobs 
and  most  of  them  had  opportunities  for  both.  Pohcies  emphasized  robust 
economic  growth  and  thriving  enterprise.  Government  contributed  sig- 
nificantly  to  productivity  by  investing  in  both  human  capital  and  public 
infrastructure.  The  GI  Bill  subsidized  college  and  vocational  educations. 
The  interstate  highway  system  contributed  to  industry’s  effkziency.  Low 
interest  rates  encouraged  enterprise  and  enabled  an  unprecedented  pro- 
portion  of  young  families  to  buy  their  own  homes. 
In  contrast,  today’s  policies,  both  fiscal  and  monetary,  are  greatly  influ- 
enced  by  the  interests  of  retirees  in  preserving  their  incomes  and  wealth. 
The  enemy  of  both  fixed  incomes  and  financial  asset  values  is  inflation. 
An  enhancement  of  the  former  is  high  interest  rates. 
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However  the  United  States  and,  indeed,  other  industrialized  nations 
deal  with  problems  arising  from  the  real  costs  to  working  people  of  sup- 
porting  retirees,  they  should  recognize  that  the  problem  is  not  something 
that  will  burst  upon  us  a  quarter  of  the  way  into  the  next  century.  It  is 
here  already.  And  they  must  remember  that  a  nation’s  future  depends  on 
the  vigorous  growth  of  robust  enterprises. 
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Notes 
1.  1990  was  hardly  a  year  of  roaring  prosperity;  a  business  cycle  contraction  was 
occurring  during  the  last  five  months  of  the  year. 
2.  See  Leonard  A.  Rapping,  “The  Rise  in  Income  Inequality:  Causes  and 
Possible  Responses,”  in  Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou,  ed.,  Aspects  of  Distribution 
of  We&  and  Income  (New  York:  St.  Martin’s  Pres,  l994),  p.  176. 
3.  See  Rapping,  “The  Rise  in  Income  Inequality,”  p.  180.  Rapping  cites  the 
research  of  John  Bound;  McKinley  Blackhum;  David  Bloom  and  Richard 
Freeman;  George  Johnson;  Lawrence  Katz;  Kevin  Murphy  and  Ana 
Revenga;  McKinley  Blackbum,  David  Bloom,  and  Richard  Freeman;  and  W. 
Ferguson,  who  have  not  heen  able  to  explain  most  of  the  increased  incqual- 
ity  in  the  1980s. 
4.  Howard  N.  Fullerton,  Jr.,  “Another  Look  at  the  Labor  Force,”  Mom&  L&or 
Review,  November  1993;  and  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Current  Pop&tion 
Reports,  November  1992. 
5.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Consumer  Expenditure  SM~V~,  1987;  Daniel  R. 
Waldo,  Sally  T.  Sonnefeld,  David  R.  McKusick,  and  Ross  H.  Amett  III, 
“Health  Expenditures  by  Age  Group,  1977  and  1987,”  He&  Cure  Finuncing 
Reuiew,  He&  Cure  Finuncing  Adminktrution,  Summer  1989. 
6.  Consumer  unit:  (1)  all  members  of  a  particular  housing  unit  who  are  related 
by  blood,  marriage,  adoption,  or  some  other  legal  arrangement,  such  as  foster 
children;  (2)  a  person  living  alone  or  sharing  a  household  with  others,  or  liv- 
ing  as  a  roomer  in  a  private  home,  lodging  house  .  .  .  hut  who  is  financially 
independent;  or  (3)  two  or  more  unrelated  persons  living  together  who  pool 
their  income  to  make  joint  expenditure  decision.  Students  living  in  univer- 
sity-sponsored  housing  are  separate  CUs. 
7.  Fullerton,  “Another  Look  at  the  Labor  Force.” 




Medicare  is for  persons  eligible  for  So&al  Security.  It  is essentially  a  “retiree” 
program.  Medicare  benefit  payments  are  not  included  in  CU  income  or 
expenditures.  Funds  that  henefit  consumem  from  many  government  aid  pro- 
grams,  for  example,  unemployment  compensation,  public  assistance,  and 
food  stamps,  are  included  in  income  and  are  reflected  in  expenditures. 
The  percentage  indicated  hy  the  actual  Bureau  of  Labor  Sratistics  data  for 
1990  is  19.1.  Idiosyncratic,  out  of  trend  declines,  both  in  the  number  and 
expenditures  of  retired  CUs,  occurred  in  1990.  ln  both  1989  and  1991,  20 
percent  of  the  average  working  CU’s  product  was  consumed  by  retiree  CUs. 
Waldo,  Sonnefcld,  McKusick,  and  Amett,  “Health  Expenditures  by  Age 
Group,  1977  and  1987.” 
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